Ethnic Conflict in Sindh
October 2011
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The Background Paper on Ethnic Conflict in Sindh has been commissioned by PILDAT to assist and support an informed dialogue on the ethnic conflict in Sindh. This peer-reviewed paper is authored by Mr. Muhammad Feyyaz, who holds a Masters degree in War Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad and M.Phil. in Peace & Conflict Studies from the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

The paper has been prepared as a background for a conflict resolution simulation exercise for Members of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh.

Sindh is Pakistan's second largest province with approximately 24% of the nation's population and is located in the south-eastern part of Pakistan. The partition of 1947 changed the demographic complexion of Sindh. The Muslim Sindhis constituted a majority, while a substantial number of Hindu Sindhis, Christians, and Parsis were also living in that territory, particularly in Karachi, which at the time of partition was a city of 300,000 inhabitants. At the time of partition of 1947, a large number of migrants from India also settled in Sindh, mostly in Karachi. Sindh is the only province of Pakistan where ethnic polarisation is serious because of the presence of large ethnic groups and their clashes of interests. The ethnic combustion in Sindh is most distinct due to its disparate ethnic makeup and socio-economic ramifications for the entire nation. The paper is an attempt to explore and illuminate salient dynamics of the ethnic conflict in Sindh.

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The views, opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the British High Commission, Islamabad or PILDAT.

Islamabad
October 2011
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Introduction

Pakistan is a multilingual, multiethnic and multicultural country with more than sixty (60) languages being spoken and dozens of ethnicities residing in it. The struggle for Pakistan transcended ethnic, lingual, cultural and regional differences, it even defied geographic compulsion. Conversely, it was an expression of a deep Muslim consciousness which was both inspiring and invigorating. As a nation state in post-independence period, however, some have described the country a collectivity of mere images, hence distortion of reality; few have labelled it an unimagined nation, yet others have termed Pakistan an unachieved nation, positing that nationalism is a failed project in Pakistan. The underlying rational constructing this view in a major part owes its inspiration to the argument that there has never been true unity among ethnic groups, only a forced lumping together by the British, which has given way to citizens for whom ethnicity remains more important than nationality, thus the persistence of ethnic identities. The syndrome in turn has given rise to ‘fissiparous tendencies that ethnic groups have developed right from the beginning’. In 1971, Pakistan became the first post colonial state that suffered a successful secessionist movement that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. The Post-1971 Pakistan has witnessed Baloch insurgencies (1973-77, 2002-to date); Pashtun separatism (1970s); Sindhi regionalism (1980s); and Mohajir’s mobilization along ethnic lines (1990s). The contemporary society in Pakistan is riddled with deep ethnic, social and economic fissures and therefore, quite apart from Islamists, as in 1970s there are violent secular movements in all four provinces of Pakistan that pose serious risks to national integrity. The challenges are indeed mounting, at the same time, these very developments offer the opportunity for seeking solutions in a multi-ethnic framework. The prevailing ethnic landscape of Pakistan is irrefutably a byzantine muddle warranting a wholesome review, while this background paper is a selective attempt confined to exploring and illuminating salient dynamics raging ethnic conflict in Sindh. It has been developed as part of a series of conflict resolution workshops initiated by PILDAT which aim to sensitize elected legislators on important national and regional issues, and in the process build their conflict resolution capacity and allied skills.

The Context and Structure of the Paper

The province of Sindh has been convulsed by ethnic conflicts since the early years of independence. While other provinces of Pakistan are ethnically not so diverse, the ethnic conflagration in Sindh is most distinct and fluid due to its disparate ethnic makeup and socio-economic ramifications for the entire nation. Violence in Sindh is multifaceted and has been evolving into different forms overtime; the scope of this compilation is essentially ethnicity-driven conflict spanning the entire history of the conflict situation. Immense research work on Sindh already exists; a particular feature of this paper is to capture currency of violent undertones of the conflict as prevalent in October 2011 as well as synthesise undercurrents generated by different structural and systemic dimensions of ethno-nationalism.

1. Malik Asif Hayat, Ethnicity in Pakistan - A Case Study, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Session 62, Lahore, Pakistan.
6. Muhammad Mushfaq, Managing Ethnic Diversity and Federalism in Pakistan, European Journal of Scientific Research ISSN 1450-216X Vol.33 No.2 (2009), pp.279-294, http://www.eurojournals.com/esjr_33_2_07.pdf, accessed 9 Sep 2011. Note: several words with different spellings have been used in the paper interchangeably to denote pashtun ethnicity. Likewise, for baloch ethnicity, the adjective used mostly include baloch which is in usage currently but also at places baluch as extracted from original text of published scholarship has been applied.
9. Generally the name of Province Sindh, has been used throughout barring some exceptions where the word ‘Sind’ has been reproduced as found in original texts of published works by different authors.
For the purpose of unity of thought, it is essential to lay down a working parameter with regards to both theoretical as well as empirical definition of ethnicity.

Precise definition of ethnicity is not easy. Scholars have defined it according to their schools of thought while globalization has furthered its meanings hitherto un-associated with ethnicity. Theoretically thus it emerges that it is not exclusively racial or cultural, religious, or even political. At its core it is probably psychological, i.e., the perception 'what separates us from them.' In this sense, it is a shared sense of vulnerability of shared fear, and at its best, of shared aspiration. It is also a safe harbour for collective hatred. It is for this reason that for ethnologists, Mohajir nationalism represents a paradox in the context of ethnic conflict. Unlike Bengali, Sindhi, Pakhtun and Baloch nationalist movements which represented relatively well-defined historical communities identified with their respective geographical units, the mohajir ethnicity is still passing through its birth pangs. It was thus termed by some as ethnicity-in-making since ranks of Mohajirs are found in political forces across the board. Regardless of the political affiliations and traditional ethnological criteria, this paper employs Mohajirs as a distinct ethnic identity consisting of both the Urdu-speaking migrants from India as well as other linguistic groups (Gujratis, Bohras, Khojas) who later joined this collectivity.

The paper loosely comprises five sections. It first captures broad contours of character of Pakistani state. Feeding on this foundational basis conflict paradigm is discussed next, tracing genesis, discerning drivers and identifying principal protagonists. This covers the period between 1947 and 1980 but also provides reference to pre-partition era wherever deemed necessary. The discourse then deals with the transformation of nature of conflict from 1980s onward. The bracketing of the temporal periods is however flexible and has been transited at places to aid clarity. The discussion here reviews the ethnic conflagration systemically, attempting to locate pattern differentiations and new actors vis-à-vis trends observed in the earlier period. Organized violence in Karachi and emerging trends shaping the evolving character of conflict in Sindh constitute last sections of the paper respectively. In its focus the thesis is descriptive analysis short of presenting prescriptions. That however, does not imply that a deliberate restraint has been applied in incorporating controversial or unsubstantiated views and writings in the paper; instead the contrary is true in order to engender an all encompassing synthesis. Besides, care has been exercised in avoiding qualitative interpretation of various causational variables in order to retain a non-partisan flavour in the paper.

**The Development and Character of State of Pakistan**

Soon after partition, a new nation-state, nascent independence and multiethnic character required a viable and effective state structure, in terms of the bureaucracy and the military, to sustain it. The state structure that emerged was much stronger over government and civil society, with the result that the military and political processes became synonymous with each other. Portraying Pakistan as an Islamic entity distinct from Hindu India, the official scribes of nationalism saw regional identities as threats to the state. This was not without a cost. Using Islamic bond to justify suppressing the distinctive linguistic and cultural mores of Pakistan's regional peoples, especially during protracted bouts of military dictator, had politically divisive effects. The evolved actors utilized their power of patronage to co-opt significant segments of dominant socio-economic elites and to localize political horizon in a manner reminiscent of the colonial state. This in turn, tended to augment ethnic tensions and violence which came at a tremendous cost as the defence expenditure helps to sustain an illiterate, malnourished, and underdeveloped society and a social environment that causes conflicts of various types. These social undercurrents illustrate the dangers that highly centralized states face when confronted with societal grievances.
Pakistan has thus been called a rentier security state whose action, it is alleged, is rarely guided by feelings of altruism for its people. Putative threats precede the priority of developing the country or dealing with conflict in society from the peoples' angle. Pakistan has also been classified as a state-nation in contra-distinction to nation state. A state-nation believes in putting people at the service of the state; the people are to serve it and do not have a purpose other than this. On the contrary a nation-state is supposed to serve the people within its borders; their welfare is the principle objective of the state.

Selig S. Harrison notes that the Pakistani state that emerged from the 1947 Partition of British India put together warring ethnic groups that had never before been united in the same polity prior to the arrival of the British. After resisting Punjabi incursions into their ancestral homelands for centuries, the Baluch, Sindhis and Pashtuns found themselves trapped in a political structure dominated by a Punjabi majority that controlled both the Armed Forces and key political institutions.

Punjab is the most populous and relatively developed and prosperous region of the country. Its predominance in 'armed forces and to a lesser extent in the civil bureaucracy' has been perceived by smaller units as 'Punjabisation' of Pakistan. Military ruled for the longer period (1958-69, 1969-71, 1977-88, and 1999-07) and this rule has been argued 'synonymous with Punjabi domination' in Pakistan. Therefore, 'at the core of ethno-regional sentiments' in Pakistan is the perception that 'Punjabi community dominates the politics and society of the state.' It is also argued that Punjab dominates and as a result has 'never seen the need to press for greater autonomy.'

Possibly for the same reason, for the governments in Pakistan, the word nationality has remained anathema to national integration and evoked strong reactions. The Bhutto government's case for banning the NAP (National Awami Party) in 1975 and trial of its leaders on the charge of sedition was based largely on a resolution passed by the central working of the [Pakistan Peoples'] party stating that there were four nationalities in Pakistan. The government also passed a law in 1975 prescribing a seven-year imprisonment for individuals advocating the presence of more than one nationality in Pakistan. The State of Pakistan and the right-wing establishment have traditionally equated the word nationality with secession and, thus, considered it an anathema to Pakistan's integrity and survival as a state. As a result, the "practice" of truly democratic and representative politics has proven elusive. and the state has long been dominated by 'elites' dedicated to advancing its own interests largely to the exclusion of those of society at large. Combined with the narrow sectional politics encouraged by weak representative institutions, these elite tactics cause[d] greater segmentation of society along lines of class and ethnicity, as well as a debilitation of organized opposition to elite interests.

After the secession of East Pakistan and its reinvention as the country of Bangladesh, the state used its force to brutally suppress all [ethnic] movements with no room for accommodation and compromise. Critics therefore contend that as if there was no lesson learned from the separation of East Pakistan. It needs emphasis, however, that among many other related provisions in the Preamble and Part I, Constitution of Pakistan in its articles 25, 33 and 38 provides for equality of citizens before law, discouraging parochial, racial, tribal sectarian and provincial prejudices among the citizens as well as promotion of social and economic well being of the people irrespective of the sex, caste, creed or race.
Conflict Paradigm Genesis, Drivers and Protagonists

Sindh is Pakistan's second largest province with approximately 24% of the nation's population. The region has historically enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, allowing for the development of its own culture. Sindhis have historically been known to promote a culture of non-violence, secularism and democracy. In Sindh, urban society was overwhelmingly Hindu, and no Sindhi Muslim salariat existed, instead they tended to be either landowners or peasants, while the salariat generally consisted of migrants. Second and more influential social class in Sindh was the landlords, who in the absence of a Sindhi bourgeoisie and a strong middle class, enjoyed the position of being economically, socially, and politically the most powerful class of the Sindhi society. Even though in pre-partition Sindh, non-locals dominated business and administrative positions, yet Sindhi language and culture remained superior to as compared to other languages of West Pakistan, and Sindhis wanted to maintain their identity.

Before 1947, there was no record of conflict between Sindhi and Urdu-speaking populations, while feelings of Sindhi nationalism were noticeable. When Sindh was part of Bombay, Muslim Sindhis resented the manner in which their rights were usurped by the outsiders. Sindhi was separated from Bombay presidency and formed a separate province in 1936. The reasons advanced for separation were 'on grounds of Sindh being a separate entity, a cultural and linguistic whole with its distinct identity.' Though the pre-partition Sindh was not an 'ethnically pure region,' there was no substantial antagonism by the Sindhis against the Baloch and Punjabi settlers. The Sindhis had assimilated various Baloch tribes who had come in Sindh from the west and northwest, and also some of the Jat clans who had moved from the South Punjab during the later stages of ethnogenesis of Sindhis (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). The tradition of clan or tribal life in some upper parts of Sindh traces its root as a result of these migrations. According to the 1941 census, the Baloch in Sindh constituted 23 per cent of the Muslim population of Sindh. These people adopted Sindhi language and were 'assimilated into the Sindhi culture.' But the situation was not wholly free of tensions in ethnic terms. It is significant to note that the earliest attacks against “Punjabi domination” in Sindh were launched even before the establishment of Pakistan. Many articles written by Pir Ali Muhammad Rashidi in G.M. Syed's Daily “Qurbani” and later on compiled in a book entitled “Faryad-e-Sindh” fuelled and fanned the ethnic fire against Punjabis. Mr. Rashidi wrote “we can clearly see that after the establishment of Pakistan, the central government would be in the hands of Punjabis, and after some time they would also dominate the provincial government of Sindh. The Punjabis are trying to occupy Sindh because all avenues of employment in Punjab are now closed and a single inch of land is not left there.” The book had thus created some anti-Punjabi bias in Sindh when independence came to August 14, 1947. This is also a fact, however, that there exists evidence of rejection of ethnic assertion ‘in a letter to Jinnah of May 14, 1947, from...
G. H. Hidayatullah, a Sindhi leader based in Karachi: “Some enemies of my wife and myself have been making statements in the press that we two are advocating the principle that Sindh is for the Sindhis only. This is entirely false and baseless. Both of us are ardent supporters of Pakistan, and we have given public expression to this. Islam teaches universal brotherhood, and we entirely subscribe to this... All this is nothing but false propaganda on the part of the enemies of the League.”

A week later Abdus-Sattar Pirzada issued a statement making clear that Pakistan would be the home for all Muslim immigrants from India: ‘Sindh has been the gateway of Islam in India and it shall be the gateway of Pakistan too.’

During the immediate post-independence period, massive migration took place across the borders of Pakistan and India. The influx of people into Pakistan, however, continued well into the second decade of its existence. By mid-1963, Pakistan had received an influx of almost 10 million people from across the border, representing approximately 11 per cent of the total population. This immigration was, however, lopsided. Of the estimated 7.2 million people who migrated to Pakistan by 1951, 6.5 million settled in West Pakistan compared with only 0.7 million in East Pakistan.

Within West Pakistan, major share was borne by Punjab since a majority of migrants came from East Punjab. At this stage, two contentious issues created a quandary for the political leadership, evoking intervention by the founder of the nation - the Quaid-e-Azam. The first was related to rehabilitation of refugees and second to selection of national capital.

Given the mass of refugees into west Punjab, the Provincial Government [of Punjab], felt that it had done everything it could to absorb the refugees...[it] suggested that it was now the turn of Provinces like Sindh and the Frontier to resettle refugees in their areas. Ghulam Mohammed, the Central Finance Minister, pointing his accusing finger at M.A Khuhro, who had been dismissed as Chief Minister of Sindh in April 1948, on charges of corruption and maladministration, said in the Constituent Assembly: “He bamboozled the administration and inflamed the Sindhi and the non-Sindhi question. The people who had money, the Zamindars, were so much poisoned against the refugees that in some places not only were they turned out but they were attacked. The refugees had no place to live, whereas houses were lying vacant and they were kept for their favourites, for Sindhis and none else.”

Notwithstanding the veracity of claims made in this speech by Ghulam Mohammed, Feroz Ahmed, a leftist Sindhi intellectual, asserts that communalism riots were instigated to drive out Sindhi Hindus and make room for influx of Urdu-Speaking refugees, calling themselves Mohajirs. Nearly after one year during August 1948, Sindh and State of Khairpur were ordered by the Central Government on behest of Governor General to take 200,000 and 100,000 refugees respectively. Despite enormity of immigration into Punjab (Table below), the most dramatic upheaval was not experienced by Punjab but by Sindh, for migration radically transformed the ethnic map of Sindh while leaving that of Punjab virtually untouched. Altogether, 800,000 Hindus, most of whom were Sindhis, emigrated into India from Sindh and the State of Khairpur. Mohajirs took over the property of the Hindus, giving rise to a sense of deprivation amongst the Sindhis. A bill passed by the Sindh Assembly requiring the return of 2 million acres of land, mortgaged to Hindu money lenders, to the original (Sindhi) owners was not converted into law, on the intervention of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali
Jinnah. Instead, these lands were allotted to migrants from India, 40% to Urdu-speaking and remaining to others.  

The process of refugee rehabilitation in Karachi and Sindh generally remained far from satisfactory. Even in 1954, i.e., 7 years after partition, no less than 2,40,000 out of a total of 7,50,000 refugees in Karachi were still to be rehabilitated. The region's local politicians were also not as sensitive to mohajir claims as they could have been: most provincial refugee rehabilitation ministers were Sindhis, Altaf Hussain claims. While in Punjab, immigration had virtually stopped in 1948, in Sindh it continued even after the passport and visa system was introduced for travel between India and Pakistan. Between 1941 and 1951 the number of those whose native language was Urdu rose from 32,000 to 579,000 (by 1380 per cent) compared to other languages. Sindh was incorporated into Pakistan peacefully, but Sindhi discontent soon erupted not only in response to Punjabi domination of the new Pakistan central government, as such, but also because Punjabi rule was buttressed in Sindh by an alliance with leaders of the Urdu-speaking Muslim immigrants from India, who soon

Although the mohajirs came to Sindh from five different regions, yet they had enough in common culturally and ideologically to enable the development of a sense of common identity. They gradually formed a single group and came to be known as the Mohajirs. These differences were patterned along sectoral lines also. 63.9 per cent of refugees in Sindh lived in urban areas, 86.16 per cent in Hyderabad district and 71 per cent in Sukkar. In Karachi, there were only 14.28 percent speakers of Sindhi in 1951 as opposed to 58.7 per cent who spoke Urdu as their mother tongue. Thus, Karachi overnight became a mohajir city. It grew from 3,60,000 inhabitants in 1941 to 1.1 million in 1951.

Between 1941 and 1951 the number of those whose native language is Sindhi dropped from 3,536,000 to 3,349,000, i.e., 5.3 per cent, in the province of Sindh and the State of Khairpur, though the population rose by 11.9 per cent during these years. At the same time, the number of those whose native language was Urdu rose from 32,000 to 479,000 (by 1380 per cent) compared to other languages. Sindhi was incorporated into Pakistan peacefully, but Sindhi discontent soon erupted not only in response to Punjabi domination of the new Pakistan central government, as such, but also because Punjabi rule was buttressed in Sindh by an alliance with leaders of the Urdu-speaking Muslim immigrants from India, who soon

### Table 1: Patterns of Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Refugees</th>
<th>Share of Refugees</th>
<th>Ratio in Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7.22 Million</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Bengal</td>
<td>0.7 million</td>
<td>9.67%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Pakistan</td>
<td>6.25 million</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>5.3 million</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh (ex K)</td>
<td>0.5 million</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>0.61 million</td>
<td>8.53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


50. Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan, op.cit.
52. Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan, op.cit.
53. This refers to those non-Urdu speaking migrants from India which included bohrs, memon, khojas etc.
56. Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation: Pakistan Searching for its identity in Pakistan Nation, Nationalism and the State (ed), p.16
57. Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan, op.cit.
58. Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation, op.cit.
challenged Sindhhi control of local institutions.\(^60\)

Another Controversy that the Quaid-e-Azam was called upon to decide was that relating to the opposition of Sindh leaders to the contemplated move of the Central Government to make Karachi the capital of Pakistan. This controversy brought to light the conflict and tension that was brewing between the Punjabi and Sindhhi interests in Karachi.\(^61\) Karachi's localisation had played in its favour when the time to choose a capital had come for the Muslim Leaguers.\(^62\) Nonetheless, Karachi, which had lost around 75% of the 51% Hindus who composed its population before 1947, became the administrative capital of Pakistan and its economic centre\(^63\) in July 1948. This decision fuelled the anger of Sindhhi ansars towards the mohajirs, whom they deemed as arrogant city-dwellers full with contempt for the "sons of the soil." The seeds of ethnic strife were thus planted in Sindh.\(^64\) This also meant a considerable financial loss for Sindh, since "through the acquisition of Karachi by the centre Sindh was deprived of its most highly productive area from the point of view of its revenue yielding capacity."\(^65\)

The Mohajirs, who accounted for one-fifth of the population of Sindh, represented 57 per cent of the city's population. To begin with, they enjoyed a certain prestige upon to decide was that relating to the opposition of Sindh leaders to the contemplated move of the Central Government to make Karachi the capital of Pakistan. This controversy brought to light the conflict and tension that was brewing between the Punjabi and Sindhhi interests in Karachi.\(^61\) Karachi's localisation had played in its favour when the time to choose a capital had come for the Muslim Leaguers.\(^62\) Nonetheless, Karachi, which had lost around 75% of the 51% Hindus who composed its population before 1947, became the administrative capital of Pakistan and its economic centre\(^63\) in July 1948. This decision fuelled the anger of Sindhhi ansars towards the mohajirs, whom they deemed as arrogant city-dwellers full with contempt for the "sons of the soil." The seeds of ethnic strife were thus planted in Sindh.\(^64\) This also meant a considerable financial loss for Sindh, since "through the acquisition of Karachi by the centre Sindh was deprived of its most highly productive area from the point of view of its revenue yielding capacity."\(^65\)

The Mohajirs, who accounted for one-fifth of the population of Sindh, represented 57 per cent of the city's population. To begin with, they enjoyed a certain prestige due to the fact that they had played a leading role in the making of Pakistan and had often suffered severe hardships for migrating to the new state.\(^66\) In fact, Mohajirs were initially and popularly viewed as intellectual leaders in Pakistan.\(^67\) It needs mention that as a result of migration, the Urdu-speaking population, marginal in the areas comprising Pakistan prior to independence, rose to a significant 6.9 per cent of the western wing's population in 1961. However, their influence in state affairs far exceeded what their numbers might suggest.\(^68\) In the early years of Pakistan, the country was dominated by two communities, the Punjabis, who were over-represented in the army and in the administration, and the Mohajirs, who were also over-represented in the bureaucracy and controlled the political decision centres.\(^69\) Out of 82 Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers who chose to opt for Pakistan,\(^70\) majority belonged to Urdu-Speaking community. Also, they made little effort to conceal the fact that they looked at Sindhi culture as a rustic, and hence less sophisticated. Thus, they felt no psychological need to assimilate with this culture and learn Sindhi. Consequently, the Mohajirs remained a non-assimilationist, urban and privileged minority in Sind.\(^71\)

Besides Mohajirs not only dominated politics and bureaucracy but also business. The Gujarati-speaking migrants from Bombay in India, especially Memon, Bohra and Khoja communities, were in the vanguard of industrialisation in Pakistan. They controlled seven of the twelve largest industrial houses.\(^72\) With industrialization taking roots in Sindh, by the end of the 1950s, domestic economic migrants from Punjab began to migrate to Karachi. A second wave of domestic migration took place during the 1960s, this time essentially composed by Pathans (Pakistani Pashtuns) looking for economic opportunities who settled in Sindh's main urban centres.\(^73\) Karachi's civil and police administrations were heavily controlled by Punjabis, while this community along with Pakhuts- also dominated the building and transportation sectors.\(^74\) In 1964 Gohar Ayub, led a victory parade right into the heartland of Opposition territory in Karachi, and the civil administration's failure to stop the rally led to a fierce

61. Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan p.289
64. Laurent Gayer A divided city, op.cit.
66. Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation, p.16.
69. Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation, p.18.
72. Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan, op.cit.
73. Lionel Baixas, Thematic Chronology of Mass Violence in Pakistan, op.cit.
74. Altaf Hussain, My Life's Journey, op.cit, p.xx.
clashes between opposing groups with many locals being killed.\textsuperscript{75} The eye accounts reveal of Pathans attacking the Mohajirs for supporting Fatima Jinnah in the presidential elections.\textsuperscript{76} This was the initiation of pathans-mohajirs ethnic politics in Sindh.

In rural Sindh another major source of grievance emerged with the controversial allotments, to military and civil bureaucrats, of land brought under cultivation by the Sukkur, Guddu and Ghulam Mohammad barrages. The abstraction of a centre dominated by Punjabis was now literally brought home to the Sindhis in the form of Punjabi landholders who were occupying a substantial portion of the choicest lands in Sindh. Out of 1.48 million acres of land made cultivable by the Ghulam Mohammad Barrage, 0.87 million acres were allocated to defence personnel, tribesmen of Quetta and the Frontier, and settlers from East Pakistan. Of the 0.64 million acres of the Guddu Barrage land, 0.32 million acres were allocated to defence personnel, civil bureaucrats and families displaced by the construction of the new capital, Islamabad (in Punjab), and the Tarbela and Mangla dams (in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province). Of the 0.28 million acres of Sukkur Barrage land, 0.13 million acres were given to army personnel. In most instances "defence personnel" were synonymous with Punjabis.\textsuperscript{77}

In 10 years, those who regarded themselves as the makers of Pakistan had begun to recede to the background, but their ideology remained the official doctrine of the state since the Punjabis identified themselves with the Pakistan project, as evident from their adoption of Urdu. This identification prepared the ground for what Yunas Samad has called the making of 'Punjabistan', a process that was bound to alienate the other communities.\textsuperscript{78}

However, during the first twenty-four years after the creation of Pakistan, Sindhis-Mohajir conflict remained low key.\textsuperscript{79} The initial tensions between Muhajirs and Sindhis crystallized over the question of language.\textsuperscript{80} The conflict escalated when the Mohajirs remained committed to the "Two Nation Theory"; they pressed for the adoption of the Urdu language as the source for unity and identity, and Sindhis felt such assertion as an attack on their culture and traditions.\textsuperscript{81} Further resentment was caused by the imposition of Urdu as the only national language and the One Unit Plan (1955-1970).\textsuperscript{82} Although Urdu is the mother tongue of only seven (7) per cent of Pakistan's population (during 1996), historical circumstances placed it in the position of being officially designated as the national language of Pakistan. The two major factors in favour of Urdu were the emergence of Urdu as a secondary symbol of Muslim identity in pre-independence India, and its adoption as the primary language of literacy and literary expression, against their own vernaculars, by all the ethnic groups of Pakistan, except Sindhis and, in limited areas, Pushthoos.\textsuperscript{83} Sindhis' opposition to Urdu was instigated by historical causes. Tariq Rahman makes an incisive case of Urdu-Sindhi rivalry.

The Sindhi Muslims were backward in education especially the children of the feudal lords (the zamindars). To suggest measures to change this, a committee was appointed by the Bombay government in June 1913. These were the days of the Urdu-Hindi controversy all over British India because of which Urdu had become associated with Muslims. Thus, to the members of the Commission, the teaching of Urdu was one way of satisfying the Muslims.\textsuperscript{84} In sharp contrast to their recommendations, Urdu was rejected by the Sindhis as a medium of instruction. Among others the Wazir of Khairpur state, Mahomed Ibrahim Shaikh Ismail, commented as follows:

\textsuperscript{77} Shahid Kardar, Polarization in the Regions: The Roots of Discontent, p. 5-6. (for Urdu see, Ehtiaqi Tazadat: Be-Itminani Key Buniyaddi Asbaab, Progressive Publishers, Lahore, 1988.)
\textsuperscript{78} Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation, op.cit. p.18.
\textsuperscript{79} Moonis Ahmar, The Sindhi-Mohajir Conflict, Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, (ed), Montique Mekenkamp, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Lynne Rienner Publisher, London 2003, p.455.
\textsuperscript{80} Lionel Baixas, Thematic Chronology of Mass Violence in Pakistan, 1947-2007, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{81} Sana Ashfaq, Ethnic Politics in Pakistan Case Study of Sindh, Conflict Within State (ed) Iram Khalid, Department of political science, University of Punjab 2006, p.296.
\textsuperscript{82} Lionel Baixas, Thematic Chronology of Mass Violence in Pakistan, 1947-2007, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{83} Feroz Ahmed, Pakistan: Ethnic Fragmentation or National Integration? The Pakistan Development Review 35 : 4 Part II (Winter 1996) pp. 631-645. As cited by Feroz Ahmed. In 1961, for each person educated in Sindh in Sindh, there were only 1.4 persons educated in Urdu. However, in NWFP for each person educated in Pushto, there were 8 persons educated in Urdu. Similar ratios for Punjabi in Punjab and Balochi in Balochistan were 1:95 and 1:71 respectively. These ratios were computed from the figures provided in the Government of Pakistan, 1961 Population Census, Volume 3 (West Pakistan), Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1963.
\textsuperscript{84} Tariq Rahman, Language, Politics and Power in Pakistan, op.cit.
… to adopt Urdu as the vernacular of the Mohamedan Community in the province, in my opinion, is not only unnecessary, but may be positively harmful.

"The conditions prevailing in this province are vastly different from those obtaining in the Presidency proper. The Sindhi language is as much the Vernacular of the Moslem Community as that of the Hindus of Sindh; besides the Court language is also Sindhi. If Urdu is to be taught to them as compulsory language, instead of Sindhi, which is the language of the Province and the mother tongue of the Mohamedan Community, in the Primary and the Anglo Vernacular Schools, the Community will be forced to impart to their children education in two foreign languages, which to an ordinary scholar will appear a troublesome task to accomplish." 85

As such Sindhi continued to be the medium of instruction at the school level as before. Yet another sensitivity underlying rejection of Urdu was driven by socio-economic aspirations. At the time of partition, Sindhi was the medium of instruction in state schools. Above all, and what made it popular, was the fact that at the lower level of the administration and the judiciary as well as in journalism, it was in demand. 86 This position was not enjoyed by any other language of (West) Pakistan at that time because neither Punjabi nor Pashto nor Balochi, the major languages of this area, were used in the domains of power at any level. 87

It was in this backdrop that the coming in of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs from India challenged this privileged position of Sindhi. According to the 1951 Census in addition to being significant group in Karachi, the Mohajirs also dominated other Sindhi cities too: Hyderabad (66.08%); Sukkur (54.08%); Mirpurkhas (68.42%) and Nawabshah (54.79%). It meant that Sindhi was a divided province. Its cities were predominantly Urdu-speaking while its villages were Sindhi-speaking. This, in turn, implied that the Sindhis would be disadvantaged not only culturally and socially but also educationally and economically because they would have to compete with mother-tongue speakers of Urdu for jobs in the cities which would now be available at the lower level in Urdu and at the higher in English. 88 The one-unit scheme imposed by the federal government abolished both the identity and provincial autonomy of the Pakistani ethnic nationalities including Sindh.

Since 1947, G.M. Syed, a former Muslim Leaguer and an influential Sindhi politician, had continuously protested against the domination of the Mohajirs and the Punjabis over Pakistan, especially Sindh. He strongly resented the development of Urdu at the expense of the Sindhi language in Karachi and other cities of the region. Even though most of the Sindhis didn't share Syed's militancy, they appreciated his nationalist views. 89 He formed Sindh Progressive Party in 1947 and Sindh Awami Mahaz in 1953. The latter comprised four parties: Sindh Awami Jammat, Sindh Jinnah Awami League, Dastoor Party, and Sindh Hari Committee.

Jeeyay Sindh Movement came into existence in the early 1960s, consisting of cluster organizations under different names including a variety of cultural outlets. JSSF (Jiye Sindh Students Federation) was formed in 1966. Overall purpose of entire organizational collectivity was to preserve Sind's autonomy, its culture and language. 90 It nevertheless, underwent profound mutations in its structure, strategy and objectives during the following decade ranging from demand for dissolution of the one-unit and the restoration of the Sindhi as official language at the provincial level to cessation of Sindh, formation of loose federation and rights of Sindhis. 91 During the period 1971-77, it split into two factions Jeeyay Sindh Mahaz (former Sind United Front) led by G. M. Syed and Sindh Awami Tahreek (later Awami Tahreek) led by Rasool Bux Palejo.

Two important events occurred during early 1970s marking the advent of new era of regional politics in Sindh. First was accession of PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) to power diluting sentiments of isolation of Sindh to a great extent and second was the passage of (Teaching, Promotion and use of Sindhi Language) Bill of 7 July 1972.

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86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation, p. 22
91. Tahir Amin, Ethnonational Movements of Pakistan, op.cit. p. 64.
92. For details see Jeeya Sind Movement origin, evolution, rise and decline in Chapters III, IV and VI, Tahir Amin, Ethnonational Movements of Pakistan.
by the Sindh Legislative Assembly. Following the earlier language riots in the January-February 1971 between Sindhis and Mohajirs in major urban cities on language-teaching of Sindhi to Mohajir students in Hyderabad in the Secondary School Certificate examination, in July 1972 there was a replay of this bloody drama once again. Tariq Rahman notes, 'what caused extreme apprehension among the Mohajirs was clause 6 of the Bill according to which Sindhi could be used in the domains of power (offices, courts, legislature etc, and “The language-teaching provisions provided for the teaching of both Urdu and Sindhi as compulsory subjects from class IV to class XII.’ Bhutto supported this move:

We have given our lands, we have given our homes; we have given our lives [...] to people from all parts, to the Pathans, Punjabis, to the Mohajirs living in Sindh [...] What else can we do to show our loyalty, our love and our respect for Pakistan and for our Mohajir brothers?’

Bhutto’s policies were nonetheless perceived as anti-Mohajir and pro-Sindhi: Sindh was given 19 per cent share in the federal bureaucracy. For recruitment in the federal and provincial bureaucracies and admission in educational institutions, further allocation was made based on rural (60 per cent) and urban (40 per cent). In 1972, when Bhutto nationalised industry in the ten (10) leading sectors including electrical engineering, petrochemicals, iron and steel as well as rudimentary automotive assembly plants, mohajirs were dealt a severe blow.

The language riots widened the differences between Sindhis and Urdu-speaking population. The bitterness of the conflict led to the rise of militant ethnicity among the Mohajirs which led to Karachi becoming a battlefield from 1985 onwards.

In early 1970s, pakhtuns were hardly represented politically in Sindh, NAP (National Awami Party) which contested 1971 elections, failed to win any seats from Sindh. The 1977 elections, when PPP won an overall majority but in the cities of Sindh it lost all its seats in the non-Sindhi areas, and the PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) agitation which followed accentuated the division of Sindhis and mohajirs into two hostile camps. The army takeover in 1977 and the alleged collaboration of the non-Sindhs with the army and civil administration during Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1983 exacerbated these differences and created highly charged anti-Punjabi and anti-Mohajir atmosphere. It even caused migration of a few non-Sindhis from upper to lower Sindh.

The support of Afghan war resulted in the political reconfiguration of Pakistan politics. The ethnic composition of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy shifted even further in favour of Punjabis, and increased the significance of Pakhtuns due to their presence in the military and to the presence of large numbers of Pakhtun refugees from Afghanistan. These developments, which were at the expense of Mohajirs, exacerbated age-old dissatisfaction and set the stage for the emergence of Mohajir identity politics with full force. Zia, on the one hand supported Mohajirs for countering the PPP in its stronghold and on the other favoured Sindhi nationalism and also facilitated the Punjabi penetration in Sindh. This led to fleeing of Sindhi activists to rural areas who picked up arms and started profiteering on banditry. In rural areas Zia encouraged small regional factions feeding on Sindhi nationalism and launched a vicious propaganda campaign against PPP declaring it anti Pakistani; this resulted in exclusion of a truly national party representing federation, from national politics and strong resentment amongst the Sindhis against Mohajirs and Punjabis and vice versa. Besides, the scale and persistence of violence and lawlessness in rural Sindh underwent a qualitative shift in the 1980s, and has escalated even further in the most recent period.

93. Resolution No. 21 Resolution about Sindhi and Urdu Language Teaching; Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, 21 December 1970.
94. Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation, p.23
95. Arsh Saleem Hashmi, Conflict Transformation from Ethnic Movement to Terrorist Movement: Case Studies of Tamils in Sri Lanka and Urban Sindhi in Pakistan, Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad
96. Mohammad Waseem, Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan, op.cit.
99. Yunus Samad, In and Out of Power but not Down and Out: Mohajir Identity Politics, p.65
101. Farhad Khan, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore.
A parallel development during 1980s was expansion of age old kachi abadis of Karachi. Squatter settlement in Karachi and their overt time mutation from Mohajir-Punjabi patronage with the eruption of Pathan entrepreneurs in Karachi's informal housing market introduced element of coercion and violence which were not new to Karachi's bastis, but they had never reached that level and the Pathans often met with resistance, particularly in Orangi. Many Pathan transporters, who often happened to be policemen, started investing in real estate in the 1980s and so did several of the drug and arms barons who made their entry on Karachi's political stage during the Afghan war. In the following decades, Karachi bastis grew in size and in numbers with the arrival of in-migrants from Punjab, Baluchistan and the Frontier. At the height of mass immigrations from north in the mid 1980s, to allay fears of local population, the ANP's leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan, had elaborated:

“*The interests of Pakhtuns and Muhajirs are not at odds with one another in the city, in fact, both need each other and hence there is no cause for any friction between the two ethnic groups. The Pakhtuns are in Karachi for work and labour not for threatening the existence of the native Sindhis and/or other settlers including the Muhajirs.*”

As a consequence of hardening ethnic posturing, a Punjabi-Pakhtun union, the Punjabi Pakhtun Ittehad (PPI) was formed in 1987 in Karachi allegedly by the intelligence agencies to forge a Punjabi-Pashtun alliance which it is opined had run aground. But record suggests that several times during that year, clashes broke out between the PPI and MQM. The sudden death of Zia brought an end to an era of oppressive regime, paving the way for emergence of new players into political arena.

**Transformation of Conflict and Evolved Actors**

While PPP victory in 1988 substantially redressed grievances of the Sindhis, other dynamics had meanwhile nuanced the conflict with multilateral ethnic dimensions. Two powerful forces had been growing in isolation from each other during the 1970s and 1980s - the urban, mostly mohajir, middle class and the newly emerging Sindh middle class. They were on a collision course long before they actually took aim at each other, but the absence of a political voice on either side gave no warning of their impending conflict. The Mohajir had forged their struggle into a cohesive form with formation of APMSO (All Pakistan Mohajir Student Organization) by Altaf Hussain in 1978 which was a product of the perceived mohajir grievances in terms of non-delivery of promises of the PNA leaders to eliminate the quota system and to secure the lives of mohajirs against the perceived tyranny and violence.

These student leaders later formed the MQM in 1984. It was the time when students organizations by other ethnic groups as well as political parties were reigning in almost all major academic institutions of Sindh especially Karachi. Controversial reports exist of Jeeye Sindh Mahaz's extension of hand of cooperation towards MQM speculating initial contacts between the MQM leader Altaf Hussain and the nationalist Sindhi leader, G.M. Syed. Altaf Hussain does not deny his meeting with G. M. Syed in late December 1985 but asserts it being under entirely non-political conditions. In August 1986 not only that Altaf Hussain accused the Punjabi-dominated establishment of hurting the rights of the Mohajir community but in view of the marginalization of Sindhis and Mohajirs because of Zia's martial law, put forward proposals for Mohajir-Sindhi unity. For the first time in Sindh's politics, there were indications of Mohajir-Sindhi reconciliation against their common enemy.

103. Mohajirs and Pathans each constituted 25 % of Orangi's population, the remaining 50 % of the population being a mixture of Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, Bengalis and Afghan refugees.
104. Laurent Gayer A divided city, op.cit.
105. Ibid.
108. Ibid and Christophe Jaffrelot, Nationalism without a Nation.
Concurrently, the migratory flows to Karachi from upcountry which had increased significantly were now joined by Afghan refugees, and Punjabis and Pakhtuns had made major inroads not only in the business sectors but also in transport. The taking over of the transport system by the Pathan community and the business and jobs by the Punjabis created a sense of insecurity among the Mohajirs, who feared more marginalization of their role in Sindh. During the Afghan Jihad, easy access to weapons through organized criminal networks and hatred infused by Zia's anti-PPP policies, transformed the socio-cultural milieu leading to the emergence of social violence in Karachi. The city had become even more unmanageable with power failures, water shortages, uncollected garbage, etc.

The urban crisis fuelled social antagonisms which turned into ethnic rivalries due to the particular social division of work in the city. By the mid-1980s, Karachi was a powder keg waiting to explode. The Afghan jihad also brought to Karachi a culture of ultra-violence amongst the city youth. The Pakhtuns played a major role in arms and drugs mafia in the city which had evolved from Pakistan's active domination of the transport sector.

The trigger was provided in 1985 by a fatal traffic accident in Karachi turning into a spontaneous bout of rioting, and the event was “manipulated” into the first of what would become a series of incidents of multilateral ethnic violence, swelling manifold with the passage of time. The following years saw a spate of violence involving the mohajirs, Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Sindhis, and the arms and drugs mafia. Initially between 1986 and 1987, the killings: “which pitted mohajirs against Pakhtuns and then Punjabis, masked the real crisis in Sindh. Akmal Hussain has identified Karachi’s “transport problems” as “the immediate context” which made Pathan and Mohajir communities “vulnerable to being emotionally manipulated into ethnic conflict”. In 1987 MQM won municipal polls under General Zia’s military government, and then won a majority of the national and provincial assembly seats in Karachi in the general elections of 1988, taking over the Mayorship of Karachi and Hyderabad in 1988. This led to confrontation and the Province became the battleground for violence and armed conflict first resurfacing of tension in Hyderabad in late 1988 over the policies of the MQM-dominated municipal body and later by sniper fire killing hundreds of people, resulting in bloody ethnic riots between Sindhi and Mohajir communities. With the rupture of the PPP-MQM alliance, ethnic violence in Sindh claimed hundreds of lives between May and June 1990. With the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government by the president on charges of corruption and mismanagement, the level of violence of Sindh was reduced.

For the first time, conflict sphere was now inducing the state structures to intervene. Allegedly on reports of expanding violent overtones by Mohajirs at different levels, State agencies first confronted the MQM in an aborted operation in 1990, then again in 1992, and then finally between 1993 and 1996 to clean Sindh of dacoits and anti-social elements. Non-Pakistanis analysts hold that during the operation, MQM activists were harassed and fake-encounters occurred. Army also engineered split within MQM and the split away group was known as MQM - Haqiqi faction, which until today acts as an arm of the security agencies of the Pakistani State. Despite these developments, MQM remained part of the ruling coalition in Sindh (with representation in national government) in 1988-89, 1990-1992, and 1997-98.

In 1997 the party changed its name from Mohajir Quami Movement to Muttahida Quami Movement (that is, united national movement). Population profile of Sindh during 1998 stood as expressed in table.

In the period between 1988 and 1999 that is, between the military regimes of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Musharraf respectively there were various successful and unsuccessful attempts at managing violent conflict. In the urban areas conflict escalated as the MQM jostled for political power, and was used by opposition political actors as well as the state security agencies to undermine incumbent civil governments. State security agencies,

111. Yunas Samad, In and Out of Power but not Down and Out: Mohajir Identity Politics, p. 68
112. While local residents alleged that it had been engineered by the arms and drugs mafia, it is equally likely that Pakhtun transporters feeling the heat, decided to defend themselves by making it out to be an attack on the entire community.
114. Moonis Ahmar, The Sindhi-Mohajir Conflict, op.cit, p.467
115. Sudhir K. Singh, Ethnicity and Regional Aspirations In Pakistan, op.cit.
however, got behind a coherent effort at restricting MQM’s militancy in 1994-1996. After a period of intense violence and human rights abuses the MQM’s military ability was significantly dented, and the party abandoned its narrow ethnic base. In rural Sindh there were successful operations against some of the most notorious gangs of bandits, and some conspicuous instances of legal accountability of errant state personnel helped to win over popular support for such operations. The result was a significant decline in outlaw activity by the late 1990s. Nevertheless from 1983 until 1998, destructive impact of Sindhis-Muhajirs ethnic violence in Sindh, had claimed 5000 lives. Summary of major incidents between 1985 and 1990 is attached as appendix.

From 2002 onwards, and particularly after the election of MQM dominated local governments in 2005 (in elections marred by violence and widely alleged to have been rigged), there have been steady complaints that non-Mohajir communities faced discrimination in the removal of encroachments, in the conversion of land use, and in the regulation of public transport. Pakhtuns in particular began organizing themselves in order to protect themselves from what they regarded as a “planned ethnic annihilation” from Karachi.

Presently, the dynamics of the Sindhi-Mohajir conflict contain not only a potential for meaningful cooperation but also the resurgence of violence between the two communities. Nevertheless given the PPP-MQM love-leave political relationship, reconciliatory engagement and uniformity of views on national and even provincial issues, it can be surmised that the nature of Sindhi-Mohajir relations has changed from overt hostility to covert acceptability.

Among others, however, disputes exist between PPP and MQM over the division of the Hyderabad District. The former military regime of Musharraf is accused of strengthening of MQM to the detriment of other political forces. As a result, role of Awami National Party (ANP) as the sole representatives of Pakhtuns and PPP not only of Sindhis but of Baloch has assumed new dimensions in the ongoing struggle. Critics like I.A. Rehman ascribe that both PPP and MQM are responsible for widening the gulf between the old and the new Sindhis.

Organized Violence in Karachi

Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city, with a population of 1.9 crore (Mumbai has 2 crore people), is the country’s most liberal and secular metropolis. It is also Pakistan’s crime capital with a seamy underbelly of arms, drugs and land mafia, contract killers, extortionists and kidnappers, involved in a business estimated between Pakistani Rs 4,000 and Rs 5,000 crore annually. The City has witnessed many violent clashes in the post-independence period and bleeds persistently since about two decades on account of ethnic, political, sectarian and other reasons. 12 May 2007 proved watershed in accentuating entrenched animosity among ethnicities mainly in Karachi making ethnic divisions more salient. Pakhtun-Baloch assertion vis-a-vis Mohajirs and multi-faceted mafias during last three years have overtaken Mohajir-Sindhis.

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117. Haris Gazdar, Brief Note on Violent Conflict in Sindh, op.cit.
119. Haris Gazdar, Brief Note on Violent Conflict in Sindh, op.cit.
122. Karachi has seen anti-Ahmedi “riots” in the early fifties, anti-Pathan “riots” in 1965, anti-Ahmedi “riots” again in 1969-70 and Sindhi-Mohajir riots in 1972-73. However, the ethnic clashes which occurred in the second half of the 1980s in the city were unprecedented in their scale and brutality. Clashes have occurred between Pathans and Biharis in April 1985, October and December 1986, and February and July 1987, and between Mohajirs and Sindhis in May, September, and October 1988, and again in May-June 1990. Ref Laurent Gayer: A divided city. “Ethnic” and “religious” conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan May 2003.
dwindling antagonism. In much the same way, trade unions too seem to be conforming increasingly to the ethnic divisions. The most disturbing development to engulf the Province in general and Karachi in particular, is the phenomenon of targeted killings, the outcome of political manoeuvrings, religious differences and ethnic hostilities.\(^\text{123}\) ANP contends that a perception is being created by some vested interests that the unrelenting targeted killing of innocent citizens and heinous crimes in the city are because of political turf war between ANP and MQM. The Party rejects this perception and maintains that the ongoing violence is largely because of a denial of the changing demographic realities.\(^\text{124}\) It will be relevant to recall that the 1998 Census put the Urdu speaking population 48.52% and the Pashtun population at 11.42%. But certainly, 12 years after the census, there has been an ethnic transformation of the demographic complexion of Karachi reinforced recently due to massive Pashtun internal migration from Pakistan's violent tribal belt and Swat.

Above map has been drawn keeping in view number of electoral seats acquired by political parties in election 2008. Pakistan People's Party has traditionally enjoyed strong support in areas populated by Balochis especially Lyari, resided also by Sindhis and Urdu-speaking Kathiawaris. The voting pattern in the city clearly indicates the ethnic divide while PPP was able to capture vote of Balochis and Sindhi speaking voters, Urdu and Pashto speaking voters voted for MQM and ANP respectively. A close study of the map will further indicate that most of violence takes place along the fault lines where different ethnic groups are faced to each other. Previous and present regimes of MQM and PPP have liberally issued arms licenses to their workers as matter of policy and thus armed city to its teeth where a petty matter turns into a bloody clash and these licenses are over and above illegal weapons which find an easy way from western and northern parts of the country. Karachi's violent unrest has claimed some 1,000 lives during 2011, with more than 100 alone in the last week of August 2011. By contrast the Taliban and other religious extremists kill tiny numbers in Karachi.\(^\text{125}\) Ethnic warfare has reached such a level that Karachi's ambulance service now has to send out a driver matching the racial make-up of the destination district to pick up the victims of gang attacks.\(^\text{126}\) Some sources put the fatalities estimate more than 5000 in the city since 2008.\(^\text{127}\)

What makes a bloody situation even bloodier is that violence is not just political and ethnic. Land grabbing and extortion soon get added to the mix. It is with this that the citizens who having nothing to do with politics, sectarian difference and ethnic divides and get caught up in the middle of all the mayhem and bloodshed.\(^\text{128}\) All the political and ethnic groups along with criminal gangs indulge in land grabbing and at times this is one of the major reasons where these groups try to subdue and capture state/private owned land for the illegal financial gains.\(^\text{129}\)

**Evolving Trends**

Overtime, ethnic conflict in Sindh has experienced mixed trends. While Sindhi-Mohajir conflict may have been mitigated compared to its former severity, other actors

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126. Ibid.
129. A service paper presented by A.D.Khawaja, police August 2011 at the National Management College, Lahore as well as observations based on personal interview by the Author of key stakeholders belonging to major ethnic groups.
have taken to the stage mainly in urban centres. Animosity against Punjabis and Pakhtuns persists among Sindhis which came to the fore during unilateral armed protests following assassination of former PM. Benazir Bhutto especially in rural Sindh and along national communication arteries. There are strong indications of rejoining of alliances among non-mohajir political forces once again. Over a period of time, Urdu speaking population under MQM and Pashtun speaking population under ANP is emerging into bigger ethnic clusters of residence in the city, other communities like Balochi, Sindhi and Punjabi are living mix in all areas. After disintegration of PPI, ANP emerged to represent the Pashtoon population in Karachi and is asserting its presence as symbolic representative of 2.5 millions Pakhtoons of Karachi. Some therefore interpret the trend as an emerging, counter-force to the MQM.\textsuperscript{130}

In the developing setting, the evolved protagonists engaged in real-politick involve an array of forces asserting to retain and acquire power spaces including leading political entities, religious, sectarian and militant organizations, local militias, organized criminals.\textsuperscript{131} The form and character of ongoing armed conflict confined to Karachi though, spans a spectrum of political, psychosocial, socio-economic and ideological spheres blurring the fine distinctions in defined boundaries of the interest paradigm of the participants. Infiltration by ideologues inimical to the interest of state and violent jihadis has added complexity into already fluid and explosive environment of the urban areas. In the latest round of violence, besides small weapons the terrorists freely use light machineguns, rockets, hand grenades and other weapons on the streets of Karachi.\textsuperscript{132} The retreat of state has increasingly spawned ungoverned spaces, which are aggressively contested upon access by perceived competitors. Police officials sound as if they have no space or power to stop the violence.\textsuperscript{133} Various conflict management efforts by the present government have failed to yield any fruits. Seemingly armed conflict does not appear to be dissipating. Meanwhile, according to FPCCI, when the PPP-led government took over three years back, the foreign direct investment was at $6.5 billion, which fell sharply to around $1.5 billion during the last fiscal year.\textsuperscript{134}

**Conclusion**

Some quarters suggest that ethnicity is more a product of bad governance, economic deprivation of particular areas, poor representation of certain ethnic groups in national institutions, perceptions regarding dominance by other groups and absence of self rule than any inbuilt hatred between the ethnic identities. Others suggest that structural rigidity of the society inhibits ethnic integration, which is also not in the interest of the dominating elite. Although ethnic and religious nationalist movements throughout South Asia's history have been very powerful, states in their reaction to such movements must be careful not to give the movements more momentum.\textsuperscript{135} It is imperative that not only to prevent an economic collapse but restoration of peace in Karachi in particular which is Pakistan's industrial and commercial hub and Sindh in general begs for immediate attention in a sustained manner for resolving its enduring afflictions caused by ethnic politics and other structural factors. Notwithstanding the failures by political parties, democratic institutions and civil society remain the principal hope to resolve the perennial issues following innovative conflict resolution approaches.


\textsuperscript{131} For example some of the banned sectarian organization wielding influence in Karachi mainly include but not restricted to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Sipah-e-Mohammad, Jundullah, Harkat ul Jihad Al-Islami (HuJI), Harkat ul- Mujahideen al-Alami (HuMA), Tehreek-e-Islami Lashkar-e-Muhammad (TILM), Sunni Tehreek Taliban, Jafria Alliance and Tehreek-e-Jafria.


\textsuperscript{133} Moosa Kaleem and Javaria Khan, New flashpoints, old worries, op. cit. 1.


**Appendix A**

**Summary of violent incidents: 1985-1990. . .**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Participants / actors</th>
<th>Cause/ fallout</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Women students (largely Mohajir, transporters (pathans) and police (Punjabi dominated))</td>
<td>traffic accident/ rioting</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Over 100 / dozens vehicles burnt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Early and late May</td>
<td>Rioters (Mohajir-pathans) and police</td>
<td>Ethnic grievance</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes, number not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>JSSF, PSF, DSF and JSSF-progressive</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Rural sindh</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>United Pakhtun Front and MQM</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Karachi including Lyari</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>22-23 Oct</td>
<td>Anti-government, mohajir-Pakhtun and criminals</td>
<td>Railway accident</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>22 Oct</td>
<td>Pathan attack bihari colony</td>
<td>reprisals</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>MQM-pakhtun</td>
<td>Agitation</td>
<td>Sohrab Goth, Karachi and Hyderabad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>do</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>First week Nov</td>
<td>Mohajir-pakhtuns</td>
<td>confrontation</td>
<td>Orangi1, Liaqatabad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 Dec</td>
<td>Attack against non-pakhtuns by unknown assailants</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Organgi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>PPI-MQM</td>
<td>Ethnic confrontation</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mohajirs and Sindhis</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Earlier half</td>
<td>Pakhtun-mohajir and police</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Sohrab Goth, Karachi</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Later half</td>
<td>JSSF and MQM</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sindhi extremists vs. Mohajirs</td>
<td>Reprisal</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sindhi -mohajir</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>Sindhi extremists vs. Punjabi and mohajir students</td>
<td>Ethnic confrontation</td>
<td>Hyderabad</td>
<td>Number not known</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Almost same month</td>
<td>Sindhis and mohajirs</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Nawabshah</td>
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<td>Number not known</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>APMSO -PSF</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>Karachi university</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Participants / actors</td>
<td>Cause / fallout</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Injured / material losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1 Feb</td>
<td>PPP-MQM</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Police -MQM</td>
<td>Declaratory Self-defence</td>
<td>Pucca Qila, Hyderabad</td>
<td>100 including 12 women</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td>March/apr</td>
<td>Roits-police</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Organgi, Karachi</td>
<td>20</td>
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*Source: UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 45, June 1993*